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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Alan Wayne Wellard appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of 
methamphetamine, entered upon his conditional guilty plea.  On appeal, he challenges 
the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
While patrolling a well-known drug-related area on December 23, 2014, an officer 
with the Fort Hall Police pulled over a vehicle after noticing that it had an expired license 
tag.  (R., p.158.)  Wellard was a passenger in the vehicle.  (Id.)  Because neither the 
driver nor Wellard were tribal members, the officer contacted Bingham County for 
assistance, and Deputy Henrie was dispatched to the scene.  (Id.) 
Deputy Henrie contacted the driver and, after observing signs of impairment, 
questioned the driver about drug and alcohol use, and the driver admitted that he had 
been using heroine.  (R., p.159.)  The driver further consented to a search of his 
vehicle.  (Id.)  Deputy Henrie contacted Wellard and advised him that the driver had 
consented to a search of the vehicle.  (Id.)  The deputy asked Wellard to step out of the 
vehicle and, after asking if he had any weapons, asked if Wellard would consent to a 
pat down search.  (Id.)  Wellard consented.  (Id.) 
Before Deputy Henrie conducted the pat down, Wellard turned around and asked 
why the officer needed to pat him down.  (Id.)  Deputy Henrie explained that he would 
be searching inside the car and it was for his safety.  (Id.)  After responding “okay, I 
don’t have any of that,” Wellard turned back around for Deputy Henrie to pat him down.  
(R., pp.159-60.)  During the subsequent pat down, Deputy Henrie discovered a pouch in 
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Wellard’s pocket which, before the officer opened it, Wellard admitted contained scales.  
(See State’s Ex. 3(b) at 8:35.)  The scales had a crystal material on top of them, which 
Deputy Henrie believed to be methamphetamine.  (R., p.160.) 
After searching the vehicle, Deputy Henrie mirandized and arrested both the 
driver and Wellard.  (Id.)  Wellard informed the deputy that he had warrants out of 
Bannock County and that he currently had in his possession a pipe and some 
marijuana.  (Id.)  Later, while being transported to the county jail, Wellard also informed 
Deputy Henrie that he had a baggie of methamphetamine in his belt line at the front of 
his pants.  (Id.)  Deputy Henrie found and seized the contraband.  (Id.) 
The state charged Wellard with the felony of possession of methamphetamine, 
and misdemeanors of possession of marijuana and possession of paraphernalia.  (R., 
pp.56-57.)  Wellard filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the basis that the search 
was warrantless.  (R., pp.58-59, 62-66.)  The district court denied the motion, finding 
that Wellard consented to the search.  (R., pp.156-68.) 
Wellard entered into a plea agreement under which he pleaded guilty to the 
felony charge of possession of methamphetamine, and the state dismissed the 
misdemeanors.  (R., pp.179-80; 6/16/2015 Tr., p.16, L.16 – p.17, L.21.)  Though not 
actually part of the written plea agreement, the district court represented without 
objection that this was a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the court’s 
ruling on Wellard’s suppression motion.  (6/16/2015 Tr., p.16, Ls.3-10.)  The district 
court entered judgment against Wellard and sentenced him to a unified term of six years 
with three years fixed, but retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.202-04.)  Wellard filed a timely 




Wellard states the issue on appeal as: 
 
 Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Wellard’s motion to 
suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.) 
 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
 











Determining that the warrantless search of Wellard’s person was based on his 
voluntary consent, and that Wellard did not revoke that consent, the district court denied 
Wellard’s suppression motion.  (R., pp.156-68.)  On appeal Wellard asserts that he 
revoked his consent by expressing hesitancy and, though he submitted to the search, 
subjectively not wanting to submit.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-9.)  Application of the correct 
legal standards to the facts as found by the district court shows no error in the district 
court’s analysis. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises 
free review of the trial court’s determination as to whether constitutional standards have 
been satisfied in light of the facts found.  State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 
211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009).  At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual 
inferences is vested in the trial court.  State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 
P.2d 993, 997 (1995). 
 
C. Wellard Did Not Revoke His Voluntary Consent To The Search 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
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unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”  Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357 (1967).  One exception to the warrant requirement is a search done 
pursuant to consent.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations 
omitted).  The voluntariness of an individual’s consent is a question of fact to be 
determined based upon the totality of the circumstances.  Id. at 227.  As noted by the 
district court, when Deputy Henrie asked if Wellard consented to a pat down search, 
Wellard responded “yeah.”  (R., pp.164-65; see also State’s Ex. 3(b) at 7:50.)  That is 
sufficient to show that Wellard consented to the search. 
On appeal Wellard concedes “that he initially consented to the search of his 
person.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.8.)  Wellard instead argues that he revoked that consent 
by “express[ing] hesitancy,” subjectively “not feel[ing] like he could outright refuse to 
allow the search,” and “believ[ing] he would be cited for resisting and obstructing if he 
did not comply at that point.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-9.)  While consent is revocable, 
State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 154, 106 P.3d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 2004), nothing in 
Wellard’s behavior indicates that he revoked his consent. 
Far from a defendant’s subjective beliefs, the standard for determining the scope 
of consent is objective reasonableness, i.e., “what would the typical reasonable person 
have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect.”  Florida v. 
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).  To be objective, “[e]ffective withdrawal of consent 
requires unequivocal conduct, in the form of either an act, statement, or some 
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combination of the two, that is inconsistent with the consent to the search previously 
given.”  Burton v. United States, 657 A.2d 741, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  This is because 
equivocal conduct can be construed in many different ways and, therefore, does not 
pass muster under an objective reasonableness test.  Id.; see also United States v. 
Ross, 263 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 2001) (defendant’s impatience during the search of 
his car, questions how much longer the search would last, and statement that he 
needed to be on his way did not amount to an “unequivocal act or statement of 
withdrawal of consent.”); United States v. Brown, 884 F.2d 1309, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 
1989) (having consented to a search of his luggage, defendant’s question to police 
officers at the airport: “Do I have to go?” did not withdraw his unambiguous statement of 
consent); United States v. Joseph, 892 F.2d 118, 122 (1989) (reaching into bag and 
saying “[d]o we have to do this here? … I have underwear and things in the bag,” did 
not constitute effective withdrawal when defendant then accompanied officers to a more 
secluded area for the completion of the search). 
Whatever Wellard’s subjective internal monologue, his objective external actions 
showed that he affirmed, not revoked, his consent.  After he “hesitated and inquired as 
to why he had to be searched,” Wellard placed his hands on the car, turned fully toward 
the car, and submitted to the search.  (R., p.165; see also State’s Ex. 1 at 35:00.)  Then, 
before conducting the pat down, Deputy Henrie ensured that Wellard continued to 
consent by asking, “So you don’t mind?”  (Id; see also State’s Ex. 3(b) at 8:00.)  Wellard 
gave no audible response, but again “turn[ed] back to fully face the car, with both hands 
touching the vehicle, and his arms extended.”  (Id.) 
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The district court correctly determined that Wellard gave his consent to the 
search and did not revoke that consent.  Wellard has failed to show any error in the 
district court’s analysis.  The district court’s order denying Wellard’s suppression motion 
should be affirmed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order 
denying Wellard’s suppression motion. 
 DATED this 3rd day of June, 2016. 
 
 
      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer_ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
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